We examine ownership patterns of German university-invented patents before and after the abolition of the "professors' privilege" in 2002 to explore how the legal change affected patenting activities. We find no evidence of increased patenting activities after the reform. Our data moreover show a pronounced shift from individually owned and firm-owned patents to university-owned patents. Differences in inventors' patent experience help explain the variance in ownership patterns. Both experienced and inexperienced inventors are affected by the legal change.
Introduction
In the past decades, universities have increasingly been recognized as providers of useful knowledge inputs into private-sector innovation (Jaffe, 1989; Salter and Martin, 2001) . At the same time, there has been a widespread concern among policymakers that the potential of universities to support private-sector innovation is not fully exploited, and that the results of public research could and should be put to better societal use (European Commission, 2003; OECD, 2003;  cf. also Dosi et al., 2006) .
Time and again, these concerns have motivated policy initiatives targeting an improved transfer of knowledge from public research to the private sector. Policymakers have been particularly active with regard to intellectual property rights (IPRs) over university inventions. In the USA, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave universities a blanket permission (and obligation) to seek IPR protection for technologies that their researchers developed in research funded by federal agencies. Following the Bayh-Dole Act, the numbers of patent applications out of US universities soared. Some universities secured substantial amounts of income from licenses and patent sales.
Empirical evidence suggests that the increased patenting activities of US universities are at most partially due to the Bayh -Dole Act (Mowery et al., 2001) . There is moreover an ongoing scholarly debate on the pros and cons of the Bayh -Dole Act (e.g. Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 2001; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Shane, 2004; Sampat, 2006; Kenney and Patton, 2009 ). This controversy notwithstanding, the Bayh -Dole Act has been emulated by policymakers in other countries. Among these countries is Germany, where a Bayh -Dole-like IPR regime for university inventions was adopted in 2002. Specifically, lawmakers abolished the "professors' privilege" in the law on employee inventions ( §42 of the Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz of 1957) that had hitherto allowed university researchers to retain the ownership of their inventions. In contrast, the new legislation allocates IPRs on academic inventions to the universities. In case of successful commercialization, academic inventors are entitled to a 30 per cent share of gross revenue.
Somewhat paradoxically, even though the abolition of the professors' privilege was motivated by the apparent success of the Bayh -Dole Act, in effect the reform had the opposite effect. Rather than allocating IPRs in academic inventions closer to the inventor, as Bayh -Dole had done, it removed them from the inventors in favor of their employers (cf. Figure 1 ). In contrast to the USA, the prevalent suspicion in Germany was not that university inventions might be shelved because IPR negotiations between university administrations and federal agencies were obstructed by red tape. Instead, German policymakers were concerned that individual researchers might be unwilling or unable to pursue the commercial application of their ideas (BLK, 2001) . Accordingly, the legal changes were complemented by substantial federal subsidies for newly established patent exploitation agencies (PEAsPatentverwertungsagenturen in German) (Bielig and Haase, 2004; Grimm and Jaenicke, forthcoming) . PEAs were established at the regional level; they generally serve all public universities in the respective region (mostly a Bundesland or part thereof). Existing technology transfer offices (TTOs) at the individual universities were not replaced, but generally played a minor role in licensing and commercialization activities after the reform.
Below we will study how the patenting behavior of German university professors changed after the 2002 reform. Studying these changes is warranted, first, by the ongoing controversy over the merits of the US Bayh -Dole Act. Second, it cannot be presumed that the German reform brought about the same effects as the Bayh -Dole Act (or similar reforms in other countries; cf. Valentin and Jensen, 2007; Della Malva et al., forthcoming; Takahashi Professors' privilege IPR owned by the public agency which funds a university University owns and exploits patents D USA
Increasing distance of IPR from the inventor and Carraz, 2009). We already noted that the legal treatment of German academic inventions before the reform was fundamentally different from the pre-Bayh -Dole situation in the USA. In addition, Germany has a unique division of labor between universities and nonuniversity public research organizations (PROs). As the professors' privilege only covered university researchers, but not the employees of the non-university PROs, a hybrid IPR regime existed prior to 2002, which may have conditioned the effectiveness of the reform. Further adding to the institutional complexity, some universities had established a technology transfer infrastructure already before 2002, and socialist East Germany had not known a professors' privilege prior to German reunification. Accordingly, patenting experience differed substantially among German professors.
To assess the changes brought about by the reform of 2002, both overall numbers and assignment patterns of patent applications by German university inventors are analyzed. Our empirical analysis suggests that overall numbers of university-invented patent applications in Germany did not increase after 2002. This finding is consistent with the only other study that to our knowledge has addressed this issue before (Schmoch, 2007) . In addition, German researchers had a greater propensity to assign patents to their university after the 2002 reform. In our sample, university assignment is not associated with higher patent quality. Its increasing share after 2002 comes at the expense of both unassigned and firm-assigned patents. We find a larger post-reform propensity for university assignment not only for researchers who newly begin to patent, but also for experienced inventors with prereform patents.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop a set of hypotheses on the expected effects of the abolition of the professors' privilege. Data and empirical methodology are discussed in Section 3. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
Incentives, Experience and Patent Applications: Expected Effects of the 2002 Reform

Complexity of Assignment Patterns
Patent applications based on inventions by university researchers can be divided into university-assigned, firm-assigned and unassigned patents. They may also have multiple assignees. These different assignment types have to be taken into consideration when discussing the changed incentives faced by university inventors after the 2002 reform.
The reform was enacted on the presumption that many researchers were deterred from technology transfer activities under the prevailing conditions. The underlying reasoning is nicely illustrated by the 2000 annual report published by the joint commission on education and research established by the German federal government and the Lä nder governments (Bund-Lä nder-Kommission or for short BLK). The report states that "the commission considers the so-called professors' privilege as a major reason why too few patents result from research at German universities" (BLK, 2001: 12; our translation) .
According to the report, in hearings organized by the commission in 2000, a large majority of experts from universities, PROs and other interested parties shared the skepticism vis-à -vis the professors' privilege (ibid.). It is also reported that experts advocated abolishing the privilege as one element of a broader policy, which also included the establishment of PEAs. A similar position was also taken by prominent German innovation scholars at the time (Schmoch, 2000: 102) .
The positive effect of the reform expected by its proponents is most plausible for university inventors without close links to industrial partners. As many universities did not provide support to faculty inventors before 2002, these researchers had to bear the full costs related to their patent applications and the ensuing patents, which would normally have remained unassigned. To profit from their inventions they needed to sell their patents, find licensees willing to commercialize their inventions, or alternatively engage in entrepreneurial activities.
After 2002, academic inventors no longer had to bear the financial burden of the patent application. The reduced financial risk should have lowered the threshold for professors to engage in patenting activities, resulting in larger total numbers of patent applications for university inventions after the 2002 reform. This effect may have been reinforced by enhanced technology transfer awareness and the newly established organizational infrastructure supporting inventors in their search for licensees.
However, academic inventors of unassigned patents retained all income from successful commercialization before 2002. Thus, patenting was a risky but potentially quite profitable activity, and the reform substantially reduced the amount of income that successfully commercialized inventions generate for their inventors. As a consequence, professors at the top end of the distribution of expected payoffs faced reduced expected incomes, which could have reduced their willingness to engage in patenting.
Even before the 2002 reform, the above scenario of isolated academic inventors lacking institutional support and possibly deterred by the cost and efforts of patent applications was often inadequate, as many German academic inventors assigned their patents to privatesector firms. In these cases, the financial risk of patent applications was borne by the firm, with the remuneration of the university inventor being negotiated between both parties. The reform had more unambiguously negative effects for these inventors.
It is conceivable that the reform did not affect assignment to the private sector, whichin addition to inventions not covered by the reform, for example, those based on consulting activities (Thursby et al., 2009 )-may still result from negotiations between a firm and the PEA. However, this does not seem very likely. Some German PEAs are known to pursue a strict policy of only negotiating licenses with private-sector firms, but not assignment or transfers of ownership. More generally, the existence of a third party complicates negotiations with private-sector firms as compared to the earlier situation. This increase in transaction costs may have deterred some private-sector collaboration partners, which is consistent with prior work on the commercialization of Danish biotechnology patents that has found adverse effects of the Danish Bayh -Dole-like reform (Valentin and Jensen, 2007) . It is also consistent with anecdotal evidence from the USA (cf. Kenney and Patton, 2009 , and the references therein).
In addition to unassigned and firm-assigned patents, the empirical record shows that other forms of assignment were also used before 2002. First, a number of universities owned patents even before disclosure became mandatory. This indicates both that these universities were interested in technology transfer and that at least some of their professors were willing to assign patents to them. Second, there are numerous cases of non-profit patent holding entities with names such as "friends and sponsors of technology transfer of chair X at university Y". These entities reflect private pre-reform efforts to establish transfer intermediaries at universities. Third, given that the professors' privilege did not cover researchers at non-university PROs such as the Fraunhofer and Max Planck Societies, some university researchers were able to leverage their links to these organizations (through joint appointments or research collaborations). Assigning patents to these organizations may have been attractive because they had experienced and resourceful TTOs well before 2002.
Hypotheses
The above discussion emphasized that changes in IPRs on academic inventions may have substantially different repercussions on different inventors. In this subsection, we draw on this discussion to derive testable hypotheses.
A first effect of the new IPR regime established by the reform of 2002 was to effectively insure academic inventors against the risk of losing money from patent applications. As shown above, it was the objective of the 2002 reform to induce additional patenting efforts by university researchers. The reform provided academic inventors with a cost and riskless channel of patenting and provided an institutionalized support structure. Primary beneficiaries of these changes were inventors without established industry links.
With regard to the overall number of university-invented patents, it seems plausible to expect that this "insurance effect" of the reform dominates potential negative effects stemming from the diminished payoffs for successfully commercialized inventions, as well as from frustrated negotiations with private-sector firms. In most cases, the respective inventions would still be expected to be patented, because the alternative for the inventor would be to forego all potential payoffs. Further adding to the expected increase in university-invented patents after the 2002 reform were the incentives faced by PEAs as well as university administrators. Not only was successful commercialization likely to result in substantial monetary rewards for the university, but compliance with the new legislation could be signaled by large numbers of patent applications. We therefore predict the following:
Hypothesis 1: Total numbers of applications for university-invented patents (as a share of overall patent applications in Germany) increased after 2002.
Note that Hypothesis 1 is consistent with a diminished effectiveness of IPR-based technology transfer after the 2002 reform. One reason is that it may have encouraged patent applications on marginal inventions. We also expect the reform to have influenced assignment patterns, which may also have had adverse effects on technology transfer. The reform clearly favored university-assigned patents, which accordingly are predicted to have become relatively more frequent after the professors' privilege was abolished. This is consistent with the findings of Takahashi and Carraz (2009) for a single Japanese university.
Hypothesis 2a:
The share of university-assigned patents among all university-invented patents increased after 2002.
What types of assignment are replaced when the share of university-owned patents increases? Based on the above considerations, we expect to find that unassigned patents were most strongly discouraged by the new legislation. They should only be observed for inventions based on consulting, in illegitimate cases of TTO/PEA circumvention, or when the university gave the invention back to the inventor after a negative assessment of its commercialization odds. We accordingly predict the following:
Hypothesis 2b: Among all forms of patent assignment, the share of unassigned patents decreased most strongly after 2002.
The shares of firm-assigned and PRO-assigned patents may also have been reduced by the 2002 reform. As was argued above, the additional uncertainty and transaction costs involved in the purchase or licensing of university-assigned patents may deter private-sector firms from working with university researchers in the first place. In addition, universities might increasingly have opted to retain the IPR in their researchers' inventions rather than selling them to commercial collaboration partners or licensees. Similar considerations apply to patents emerging from collaborations between universities and non-university PROs. Both financial and reputation motives may lead universities to retain the IPR in these patents.
Hypothesis 2c:
The shares of firm-assigned and PRO-assigned patents decreased after 2002.
Turning to individual inventors, we expect to find that the elimination of the professors' privilege most strongly induced patent-inexperienced researchers to assign patents to their university. In contrast, researchers who engaged in patenting activities at a time when virtually no technology transfer infrastructure existed at (West) German universities, presumably acquired skills and experience that continue to shape their later patenting activities. This conjecture informs our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The 2002 reform had stronger effects on researchers who had no prior patent applications.
An extreme form of Hypothesis 3 would posit that only newly patenting inventors were affected by the new legal framework, whereas experienced inventors continued their patenting activities much like before. If supported by the empirical evidence, this might indicate that the reform did not disrupt established private-sector links. We will pursue these issues in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Data and Variables
Data-sets
University-invented but not university-assigned patents are notoriously difficult to identify in patent databases. For several European countries, the KEINS project solved the problem by collecting and analyzing governmental listings of university researchers (cf. Lissoni et al., 2008) . Adopting the same approach for Germany is complicated by the federal character of the German university system, where staff lists would have to be obtained from 16 individual regional governments. The emphasis on privacy and staff representation issues in Germany's public sector further reduces the likelihood that official staff lists could be obtained.
Faced with these challenges, we developed two different data-sets. Our primary dataset uses the fact that German professors frequently use their title in patent applications. Following Becher et al. (1996) , our initial step was to search for patent applications made by German universities (including Fachhochschulen) that had the text "prof" in the inventor field. The search was conducted in DEPATISnet, the online patent database of the German Patent Office (DPMA).
Identifying university inventors by professorial titles is not without limitations. First, researchers below the professor rank are excluded. Second, titles may not be used consistently in patent applications. And third, numerous top-level R&D employees of German firms, in particular large and R&D-intensive ones, hold honorary professorships at German universities. The same holds for top-level researchers of non-university PROs such as the Fraunhofer and Max Planck Societies. Both groups of individuals were not affected by the 2002 reform and should thus not be included in our analysis.
1
To minimize the false inclusion of non-university inventors, we deliberately chose to limit our initial searches to university-assigned patent applications.
2 Based on extensive web searches for the about 1,300 professors who had originally been identified as inventors of university patents, we excluded individuals who were not full-time university employees or retired before 2004. Homonyms were checked for on the basis of comparing residences, assignees and technology classes of patents. For the remaining 986 professors (affiliated to 119 universities), a manual search of all patent applications with German or European priority in the period 1991-2006 was then conducted (irrespective of whether or not the professor title was used in the individual application). The assignees of these patents were classified into seven groups: (1) German universities (if applicable: jointly with individuals); (2) other non-profit organizations; (3) co-assignment to universities and firms; (4) firms; (5) individuals; (6) co-assignment to universities and non-profit research organizations; and (7) firms that employed the (future) professor at the time of the patent application.
Group 2 includes non-university PROs, but also the patent holding entities mentioned above. The latter are no longer relevant after 2002, which accounts for some reduction in the share of this group. Patents in group 7 are of no interest for our analysis because they are not university-invented. They are relevant, however, when searching for the year an inventor first engaged in patenting.
Our data-set is an order of magnitude smaller than that used by Schmoch (2007) in a similar context. This is primarily because our identification strategy excludes inventors without any university-assigned patents. Before addressing this issue, we discuss two further factors accounting for the smaller size of our sample. In both cases, the affected patents are not university-invented and therefore rightly excluded from the analysis.
As regards firm-assigned patents, we searched for honorary professors among patent applications of the seven most patent-active German companies. The results indicated that employees holding honorary professorships account for about 50 per cent of all patents assigned to the respective firms that have a professor among their inventors. Retired 1 As regards non-university PROs, individual career choices lead to self-selection into the alternative employers. The relevance of this issue is limited by the small number of respective researchers. Note also that our interest is in the effects of the 2002 reform on the behavior of university researchers. To the extent that the reform induced individual researchers to modify their career strategy, our analysis will be biased in favor of the reform. 2 We use applications rather than grants mostly because numbers are substantially larger. In addition, patent applications indicate a willingness to commercialize inventions, which is the focus of our analysis.
professors and those working at foreign universities or non-university public research institutes each account for another 10 per cent.
Differences in the samples of unassigned patents are mostly due to occasional inventors with small numbers of patent applications. To learn more about them, we drew a random sample of 100 individuals with unassigned patents and a professor title. Analyzing this sample suggests that 70 per cent of all patents do not fall into categories relevant for our analysis (e.g. those of medical professors employed at non-university hospitals). We therefore conclude that our data on unassigned patents largely cover the relevant population of university-invented patent applications.
The remaining difference between our data-set and that used by Schmoch (2007) is due to academic inventors who never had a patent assigned to a university or who did not use their professor title on any university patent application. Accounting for the first group is important in interpreting the findings of our analysis. On the one hand, that they have no university-assigned patents after 2002 shows that they did not benefit from the "insurance" provided by the reform. On the other hand, we see no good reason why the reform should have enhanced their ability and willingness to apply for non-universityassigned patents. If anything, we expect that assigning patents to private-sector firms became more difficult after the reform. These considerations suggest that inventors who never had university-assigned patents at best did not benefit from the 2002 reform, and may have even been affected negatively. Our results may therefore be biased in favor of the reform.
A second data-set was constructed using a different empirical strategy. For six strategically selected universities (Darmstadt, Dresden, Jena, Marburg, Stuttgart and Tü bingen; cf. Table 1), the full population of professors in patent-relevant fields (sciences, engineering, medical and pharmaceutical sciences) was identified on the basis of staff directories for the 2001-2002 winter term. These universities represent three regions (the Lä nder Hesse and Baden-Wü rttemberg, as well as Eastern Germany) with different traditions of technology transfer activities before 2002. For the two universities in Hesse, no university-assigned patent applications are documented prior to 2002. In contrast, the Eastern universities started to apply for patents before German reunification. In Baden-Wü rttemberg, the first efforts toward institutionalized transfer activities were taken in the late 1980s, and a regional PEA was established in 1995. For each of the regions, we selected both a university of technology (Technische Universitä t) and a traditional full university. Again, all individuals who were not full-time university employees (i.e. honorary and extraordinary professors) were excluded, which resulted in a sample of 398 individuals with patent applications. 
Descriptive Statistics
The national data-set contains a total of 5,624 patent applications. The average number of patents per professor is 6.21 (the median is 4). A total of 453 patents had multiple professors among their inventors. In these cases we use the data of the most senior professor (based on years since PhD), based on the assumption that they had the greatest influence on what happened with the patent. German priority dominates with 5,195 patents (92 per cent). Among these, 1,533 patents had additional publication documents with a European number, resulting in a total of 1,962 European patents. Figure 2 and Table 2 show that firm-assigned patents dominate among the non-university-assigned patents.
3 Tables 3 and 4 list the explanatory and control variables used in the empirical analysis, as well as the corresponding descriptive statistics. Table 5 lists correlations between the variables.
The legal reform of 2002, which is measured by a dummy variable indicating patents filed after the reform (law), is our key explanatory variable. In addition, our theoretical considerations (Hypothesis 3 in particular) highlighted the role of individual patent experience. To measure individual experience accumulated before and after German reunification, inventors are divided into three cohorts based on the years of their first patents (before 1991, 1991-2001 and after 2001) , which are each represented by a dummy variable ( patexpcoh1, patexpcoh2 and patexpcoh3 ).
Several patent-level control variables are included in the empirical analysis (cf. Table 3 ). Prior studies (Harhoff et al., 2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) suggest that there is no unique measure of patent quality. Accordingly, to proxy for patent quality we use both patent family size ( famsize) and a dummy variable indicating direct applications to the European Patent Office (epo).
4 Patent scope is measured by the number of IPC classes (numipc ).
We also control for the number of inventors (invcount) and for co-inventing professors (multprofs). Both variables may affect assignment, as having non-university employees as co-inventors is more likely in larger teams, while co-inventions of professors may indicate collaborative research with PROs or other universities, thus making firm assignment less likely. Additional control variables relate to the university to which a given inventor is affiliated. In addition to university type, we control for institutional patent experience, measured by the year of a university's first patent application (unifirstpat), as a proxy of PEA quality. Prior work has found that a university's support infrastructure for technology transfer is an important determinant of its researchers' patenting and commercialization activities (cf. Friedman and Silberman, 2003 , for an overview). Whether an individual researcher is willing to engage in patenting activities through the PEA servicing her university and whether the university is able to successfully screen its professors' research for patentable output will then depend on the quality, age and size of the transfer agencies, for instance, university TTO and regional PEA. Well-functioning transfer agencies do not only require well-trained 3 We excluded 175 patents because they were firm-assigned patents of (subsequent) professors who were at that time employed at the respective firm (group 7) or because they fell into several of the above assignment groups (groups 2 and 4; or groups 1, 2 and 4). 4 We refrain from using citations as a quality measure because of censoring issues.
(and competitively paid) staff, but also close relationships to the private sector based on personal contacts, networks and knowledge of potential licensees of university-owned patents (Kenney and Patton, 2009 ). These need time to evolve.
Individual-level controls include gender, year of PhD completion, current university affiliation, as well as a dummy variable indicating inventors who obtained their PhD outside Germany. Two alternative measures control for fields of research: the IPC section of the patent application and the researcher's department. In case of interdisciplinary departments inventors were classified according to the field of their PhD. Inclusion of these demographic, disciplinary and affiliation variables is motivated by prior findings showing that attitudes toward commercialization activities may be affected by demographic factors as well as peer effects (cf., e.g. Krabel, forthcoming, for a sample of German researchers).
The data-set for the six selected universities includes 1,931 patents invented by 398 professors. On average, there are 5.15 patents per professor (some patents have more than one professor as inventors). A total of 161 individuals (38 per cent) and 1,174 patents (61 per cent) overlap with the national data-set. As was expected given the way the national data-set 0 100 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 was constructed, we find a higher proportion of firm-assigned patents (46 per cent) for the six selected universities. Universities are responsible for 25 per cent, other research institutions for 11 per cent, and 14 per cent of the patents are unassigned (Table 6 ). Figure 3 shows the assignment patterns over time.
Results: Patent Applications by German Professors, 1991-2006
National Data-set
We begin by examining whether the absolute numbers of university-invented patents increased after 2002. To reflect the increasing trend in patent applications, universityinvented applications are compared to overall DPMA applications. Figure 4 (left panel) shows that the share of university-invented applications increased during most of the time period observed. Visual inspection does not suggest this trend became further pronounced after the reform. This impression is confirmed by a Chow test that does not suggest a structural break in 2002. Accordingly, there is no evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1.
To test the remaining hypotheses we use multinomial logit models estimating the likelihood of a patent to be assigned to the alternative categories, with university assignment as the base category (cf. Della Malva et al., forthcoming; Thursby et al., 2009) . Given the small number (83) of patents jointly owned by a university and a non-profit organization (group 6), these are dropped from the analysis.
5 Results for this specification are reported as Model 1 in Table 7 . 6 In this and all following models, we report standard errors clustered at the inventor level. (forthcoming) who analyze the effect of legislative changes on university patenting in France. The model moreover indicates that the reform had the strongest displacement effect on unassigned patents, which supports Hypothesis 2b. In line with Hypothesis 2c, the likelihood of assignment to firms and non-profit organizations also decreased significantly after 2002. 8 The later individual researchers started their patenting activities, the more probable it is that their patents are assigned to universities compared to all other groups 5 As a robustness check, we alternatively included these patents in the category 2 of applications by non-profits. This did not have appreciable effects on the results (which are available from the authors). 6 Full information is available for only 5,151 patents, but when excluding variables with missing information (mainly phdyear) the coefficient estimates of the other variables hardly change. We use departmental affiliations rather than IPC sections to measure fields of research because they have more explanatory power. 7 To assess the magnitude of this effect, we lumped together all alternative ownerships and estimated a logistic regression analogous to Model 1 with university ownership as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate obtained for law in this model implies that patents filed after the reform were almost five times as likely to be owned by a university as pre-reform patents. 8 It is conceivable that these changes in patent assignment reflect short-term effects limited to the first year(s) after the law was enacted. To test for this possibility, in unreported models we subdivided the law variable into yearly dummies (law2002-law2006 ). Contrary to the conjecture of short-term effects, this reveals an increasingly stronger trend toward university assignment: the coefficients of law2006 are twice as large in absolute terms as those of law2002 for categories 4 and 5. Non-profit University 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 (except for group 3-universities plus firms-for which patexpcoh2 and patexpcoh3 are insignificant). Finally, the positive coefficient estimate of unifirstpat for all groups (significant for individually and firm-assigned patents) indicates that professors employed at universities with longer experience in patent activities are more likely to have university-assigned patents. Coefficients of the multinomial logits cannot directly be interpreted as marginal effects. Table 8 reports marginal effects based on setting the dummy variables to zero and all other variables to their mean. The only exception is the law dummy, which is set to one, since the changes following the abolition of the professors' privilege are of interest. To obtain the probabilities of each type of assignment conditional on changes in the independent variables, the values in the respective cells have to be added to (for law: subtracted from) the baseline probability reported at the bottom of the table. For example, the probability of university assignment assuming the base value is 54 per cent and the difference of law being zero or one is 34.8 per cent, that is, the probability of university assignment for law ¼ 0 is 54 per cent 2 34.8 per cent ¼ 29.2 per cent.
To test whether the observable post-reform changes vary between professors with different patent experience (Hypothesis 3), interaction variables are introduced and a new model (Model 2 in Table 9 ) is estimated. As the critical issue is whether or not individuals had patenting experience under the professors' privilege, the two cohorts with the longest experience ( patexpcoh1 and patexpcoh2 ) are merged, and the effect of law is estimated separately for lawexpcoh12 ¼ law * ( patexpcoh1 þ patexpcoh2 ), that is, a dummy for all patents after 2002 from experienced professors, and lawexpcoh3, a dummy for the patents of those researchers with first patent experience after the legal reform. Lawexpcoh3 is identical with patexpcoh3, because by definition the respective individuals do not have patent experience prior to 2002. The results from estimating Model 2 indicate that both newly patenting researchers and those with prior experience are affected by the legal reform: the probability of university assignment increases for both groups. However, the coefficients for the law variable are roughly twice as large for researchers without patent experience under the old law (differences in coefficient estimates are significant at the 0.01 level for all assignment categories except category 3). In terms of marginal effects, this corresponds to a decrease of the post-law probabilities of (1) non-profit assignment from 11 to 6 per cent for experienced and from 11 to 1 per cent for inexperienced inventors; (2) firm assignment from 33 to 23 and 7 per cent for experienced and inexperienced inventors, respectively; and (3) unassignment from 31 to 8 and 2 per cent, respectively. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Significance: ***/**/*: a , 1/5/10%, n ¼ 5,151.
For dummy variables the marginal effect is calculated as the change from 0 to 1.
The proxy variables for patent quality included in Models 1 and 2 indicate that firm-owned patents on average have a larger spatial coverage than university-owned ones, which may reflect better underlying technologies and/or better IPR management. If firm-owned patents are inherently superior, then the trend toward university assignment may have adverse effects on patent quality. However, the quality of university-owned patents may have improved sufficiently after the 2002 reform to match that of firm-owned patents. To test this possibility, we estimated another model, interacting the quality measures with the law variable (results are available from the authors). The results show that the probability of firm-owned patents to be filed at the EPO is still higher than that of university-owned patents after the reform, even though the difference is reduced substantially. Larger patent families are even more often associated with firm assignment after 2002. These findings suggest that the quality differential between firm-owned and university-owned patents has persisted after 2002.
Patent Applications by Faculty of the Six Selected Universities
The above findings suggest that the 2002 reform had pronounced effects on the assignment patterns of university-invented patents in Germany. However, it cannot be ruled out that some of the findings are influenced by the limitations of the data-set. To address this concern, we replicated the analysis using the data-set covering the population of professors at six selected universities (see Section 3.1). Again, we begin by examining the absolute numbers of patent applications before and after the professors' privilege was abolished. Figure 3 shows that the negative trend observable after 1999 could not be stopped by the change in legislation. Accordingly, Hypothesis 1 can be rejected clearly for this data-set.
Next, we turn to the assignment patterns. We employ the same approach as for the national data-set. 9 The regression yields very similar results to those obtained for the national data-set (cf . Table 10 ). Our key explanatory variable, law, is of similar magnitude as in Model 1 and significant in all categories. 9 Since the data-set is smaller, assignment group 3 contains only 35 observations and is therefore excluded from the analysis. Most importantly, there are no inventors without pre-reform patent experience in this category.
As before, we also examine the effect of the legal reform separately for professors of differing patent experience. Analogously to Model 2, Model 4 (Table 11 ) displays the various assignment probabilities for professors who filed their first patent prior to 2002 (lawexpcoh12 ) and those who filed their first patent afterwards (lawexpcoh3 ). The differences between the two groups are smaller than those found for the national data-set and statistically insignificant, but the coefficient estimates are suggestive of a stronger effect on professors without patent experience prior to 2002.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Numbers of university-invented patents have not increased after the professors' privilege in the German law on employee inventions was abolished in 2002. The policy objective of inducing more academic patenting has been missed.
The empirical analysis did however indicate a pronounced post-reform shift in patent assignment, away from private-sector innovators and potential entrepreneurs toward public universities and the PEAs servicing them. In both data-sets analyzed above, the number of university-assigned patents has increased sharply after 2002, accompanied by absolute and relative decreases in the numbers of unassigned patents filed by their inventors as well as patents assigned to private-sector firms and non-university PROs. These results indicate that the law primarily affected assignment patterns, and not necessarily for the better. The reduced likelihood of unassigned patents may be a welcome development, because presumably this group of patents included many inventions by inexperienced and poorly networked inventors. It indicates that researchers who lacked institutional support in the past may now have access to an improved transfer infrastructure.
However, firm-assigned patents have also been displaced by university-assigned patents after 2002. We suspect that this shift may have adverse effects on the effectiveness of technology transfer, which is consistent with our finding that firm-assigned patents seem to be of higher quality. The shift away from firm-assigned patents has affected both novices and experienced inventors, indicating that established science -industry links may have been disturbed by the new legislation. University assignment of patents means that firms willing to commercialize university inventions face higher transaction costs. Worse still, anticipating problems in securing exclusive access to results with commercialization potential, firms may refrain from engaging in collaborative research activities with universities in the first place.
Several important limitations of our analysis should be noted. As discussed above, professors who have never assigned a patent to a university are missing in our national dataset. We may therefore have a disproportionally large share of individuals in our data-set who benefit from the new law or have a favorable subjective opinion of it. This suggests that the results for the national data-set provide an upper bound estimate for positive effects of the legal reform, which may partly explain why in this data-set the overall number of universityinvented patents does not decrease after 2002. 10 In contrast, the analysis of the six selected universities supports the findings of Schmoch (2007) showing a negative trend in university patenting after 1999. As regards assignment patterns, the data-set for the six universities supports the results of the national data-set. A more general limitation is due to the focus on patent applications. It is well known that only a fraction of applications result in commercially valuable patents, and even less result in successfully commercialized products (cf., e.g. Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006 , for an analysis of commercialization outcomes for patented inventions from the University of California system). In addition, we cannot prove that the identified changes in assignment patterns were caused by the reform of 2002. Likewise, favorable effects of the reform may not yet have fully materialized. For example, it could be argued that attitudes toward patenting change slowly and researchers may still be learning about the newly available support structure. While this argument cannot be ruled out, we think that the systematic changes observed in the assignment patterns of experienced inventors after the 2002 reform are not indicative of delayed reactions.
Our data-sets include substantial numbers of university-assigned patents even before the professors' privilege was abolished. A basic question therefore arises: is there any rationale for mandatory disclosure of inventions made by university researchers? Apparently, some professors sought university support in commercialization and were willing to assign their patents to the university even when they were not yet required to do so. This suggests that if policymakers are concerned about researchers who are unwilling or unable to commercialize their inventions on their own, setting up a support infrastructure for inventors and possibly subsidizing university-assigned patents may help lower patenting barriers for these researchers. In contrast to the system of mandatory disclosure introduced in 2002, such a voluntary regime could at the same time ensure that existing connections to industry are not affected. Incentives of experienced academic inventors, including potential entrepreneurs, would not be diluted.
Effectively, a competitive system could be installed that would allow all inventors to choose the type of patent assignment best suited to their needs (cf. Kenney and Patton, 2009) . For example, some academic inventors might want to retain ownership in their inventions while paying for the services of a PEA, which would not necessarily have to be the PEA currently serving their employer. Allowing inventors to choose among several alternatives in terms of IPR ownership and commercialization services should help society to approach the ideal outcome: allocating commercialization activities to the most capable party.
A drawback of such a regime would be that universities are likely to end up owning the less attractive patents as well as those of less committed and experienced inventors. However, such problems of adverse selection may be limited provided that universities can still refuse to patent technologies that they evaluate as not sufficiently promising. To be sure, from a budgetary perspective a voluntary system is less attractive than mandatory disclosure. Yet the hope for revenues from commercialization as a new source of funding for universities could be misguided anyway: patent earnings are highly skewed and the experience shows that most TTOs in the USA and UK are not profitable (Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Heher, 2006) .
